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ABSTRACT:
This paper assesses current methods for evaluating the long-term viability and 
desirability of government activities, especially Social Security and other big-ticket 
budget items.  I reach four conclusions: (1) There are several simple ways to improve the 
current debate about fiscal policy by adjusting our crude deficit measures, improvements 
which ought not to be controversial, (2) Separately measuring Social Security’s long-term 
balance is inappropriate and misleading, (3) The methods available to measure very long-
term government financing (Fiscal Gaps and their cousins, Generational Accounts) are of 
very limited value in setting public policy today, principally because there is no reliable 
baseline of the government’s likely future expenditures and receipts, and therefore (4) 
The government’s current annual and 10-year deficit projections, while highly imperfect, 
are nonetheless the best measure available for assessing fiscal policy, especially 
compared with Fiscal Gaps and Generational Accounts.
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The future of the Social Security system has become the focus of intense public 
debate as President George W. Bush’s administration moves into its second term.  The 
contours of the debate are shaped by guesses about the adequacy of long-term funding for 
the system, the consequences of diverting tax revenues into private accounts, and the 
interaction of Social Security’s finances with the rest of the government’s spending and 
revenues.  Acting today instead of tomorrow, some argue, is necessary to stave off future 
disaster.  This is almost certainly false.  Moreover, the focus on Social Security’s 
finances in isolation from the rest of public finance distorts the debate.  The goal of fiscal 
policy should be, as it always should have been, to balance our current well-being against 
concern for the well-being of generations to come.  Current policy discussions, 
unfortunately, often allude to that goal but fail to address it meaningfully.
If current and future well-being is to be the focus, the question then becomes how 
best to measure an unknowable future in a way that will assist policymakers in making 
difficult trade-offs.  Ideally, we would like to be able to measure the effects of our fiscal 
choices into the indefinite future and decide how and when to provide benefits and to 
raise revenue.  The further we look into the future, however, the cloudier the picture 
becomes.  We ultimately must choose between imprecise ideal measures and incomplete 
realistic measures.
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This paper assesses current methods for evaluating the long-term viability and 
desirability of government activities, especially Social Security and other big-ticket 
budget items.  I reach four conclusions: (1) There are several simple ways to improve the 
current debate about fiscal policy by adjusting our crude deficit measures, improvements 
which ought not to be controversial, (2) Separately measuring Social Security’s long-term 
balance is inappropriate and misleading, (3) The methods available to measure very long-
term government financing (Fiscal Gaps and their cousins, Generational Accounts) are of 
very limited value in setting public policy today, principally because there is no reliable 
baseline of the government’s likely future expenditures and receipts, and therefore (4) 
The government’s current annual and 10-year deficit projections, while highly imperfect, 
are nonetheless the best measure available for assessing fiscal policy, especially 
compared with Fiscal Gaps and Generational Accounts.
This paper thus provides a summary of several prominent lines of economic 
thinking on issues of public finance, especially regarding long-term spending and taxing 
issues.  Moving beyond that, however, this essay also offers new and extended critiques 
of those mainstream theories and of the public policy choices that we face.  The 
conclusions and policy prescriptions offered here are, to my knowledge, new to the 
literature.
There is little doubt that our current fiscal policy path is unwise, but it is essential 
to determine how best to assess what is wrong with current policies before we can 
understand how to change them.
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I. Introduction: Fundamental Challenges in Measuring Governments’ 
Activities
The decisions that we make today regarding taxes and government spending have 
profound effects not only on those of us living today, but on future generations as well.  
These effects arise for two reasons.  First, our current taxing and spending decisions help 
to determine how the economy’s productive resources will be used now and in the 
future—whether, for example, a piece of land becomes the site for a casino, a day care 
center, or a cancer research institute.  Second, the laws that we  pass generally commit the 
government to courses of action that can last well into the future.  While it is surely true 
that some laws that claim to set policy for years in advance do not really do so (such as 
tax policies passed in 2001 that purport to expire in 2010), others just as surely represent
commitments from which governments would have some difficulty withdrawing.
These effects of taxing and spending policies—on the current uses of productive 
resources, as well as on the somewhat-credible commitments to future policies that they 
frequently represent—ought to be of concern to anyone whose time horizon extends past 
the current fiscal year.  For those who care about the state of the world that we leave to 
future generations, the challenge is to find an analytical framework with which to predict 
the impact of current policy choices on future standards of living.  Typically, these 
analytical frameworks are found in macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy.
Macroeconomics does not, however, figure prominently in legal analysis.  While 
the legal literature that relies on microeconomics has mushroomed over the last two 
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decades or so,1 macroeconomics has largely remained in the background.  With some 
exceptions,2 legal scholars have tended not to include in their analyses the aggregate 
economy within which microeconomic efficiency analysis operates.  Certainly, some 
very good work has been done analyzing proposed constitutional amendments to 
constrain government spending or to limit tax increases; but such analyses need not 
directly address the question (in both its normative and positive dimensions) of how best 
to measure the fiscal status of the public sector.3
A. Deficits and Accounting Issues
The default position in public debate has typically been that fiscal responsibility is 
synonymous with annually balanced budgets (or, more extremely, with zero public 
1 The law and economics literature is too vast to summarize here.  For a good bibliography of the 
literature, see Robert C. Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics (3rd Ed. 2000).
2 See Mark R. Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and 
Macroeconomics, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1215 (1993) (surveying recent macroeconomic literature, noting that 
many current models blame poor macroeconomic performance on incomplete contracting, and suggesting 
that lawyers can help to solve such problems).  See also Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Law and 
Macroeconomics, 6 Virginia J. 84 (2003) (defining law and macroeconomics in an unusual way, describing 
the effects of law on economic actors); Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal 
at 70, 62 Md. L. Rev. 515 (2002); Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and 
Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42 Washburn L.J. 31 (2003).
3 See, for example, Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1105 (1998) (arguing that it is important to balance the budget, but a constitutional amendment is 
unnecessary because the budget balancers have won the political debate).
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debt).4  Indeed, even in the face of a weakening economy and the threat of a double-dip 
recession, President George W. Bush decided to show his economic seriousness during 
his August 2002 economic summit in Waco, Texas by announcing that he would refuse 
to spend $5.1 billion that Congress had already approved for domestic security and the 
military.5 Explaining the decision, he declared: “More money spent in Washington 
means less money in the hands of American families and entrepreneurs, less money in the 
hands of risk takers and job creators.”6
1. Accounting Periods
Setting aside Bush’s implication that government spending is presumptively 
harmful to the economy, the more immediate question is why we should be so concerned 
about an annual shortfall of revenues to cover expenditures.  Why not measure the 
government’s cash flows quarterly, monthly, or weekly?  Or, for that matter, why not 
instead evaluate the public sector’s fiscal health biannually or under Five Year Plans?
Annual accounting is not necessarily worse than any of those alternatives, but it is not 
obviously better, either.
4 When there is no deficit, of course, the political environment changes.  See, for example, Richard 
W. Stevenson, Budget Deficit Is Said to Be $159 Billion, N.Y. Times, October 25, 2002, at A27 (“The 
return to red ink brought an end to the four-year period in which surpluses and the promise of more had left 
both parties almost giddy with the possibility of addressing the nation’s needs without painful tradeoffs.”)
5 Note that $5.1 billion is approximately one-fourth of one percent of the overall 2002 federal 
budget and less than 0.05% of 2002 U.S. GDP.
6 Carle Hulse, Citing Economy, Bush Won’t Spend $5.1 Billion Approve for Security and Other 
Uses, N.Y.Times, August 15, 2002, at A15.
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If it were simply a matter of choosing among arbitrary accounting periods, then it 
might certainly be possible that annual accounting would emerge as a reasonable choice.  
On the other hand, it might be better to explore ways to measure government finances not 
based on an arbitrary accounting period but rather to determine whether the totality of the 
government’s commitments, both short-term and long-term, can be paid for.
In the case of individual projects, such as building a bridge, familiar accounting 
methods can be used to determine whether the dedicated funds to pay for the project will 
cover expenses plus interest.  In the case of projects that have no known or planned 
completion date, the challenge is to determine whether the permanent funding for a 
project can cover its projected outlays.  Social Security is a perfect example of this type 
of project, because it has a dedicated source of financing and is set to continue forever.
This will be explored in detail in Section III below.
2. Separating Spending From Financing
The majority of government activities, however, are not so easy to isolate.  The 
F.B.I., for example, has no dedicated source of financing, so it is not meaningful to ask 
whether the F.B.I. is “in balance” in an accounting sense.  The defense budget, the 
Centers for Disease Control, and so on are all simply part of an aggregated total of 
government expenditure.  Measuring their individual long-term financial viability is 
neither possible nor meaningful.
B. Long-Term Fiscal Measurement
This suggests that we should look at the government as a whole and determine 
whether, in total, its commitments can be financed with its expected tax revenues.  This 
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sidesteps both the question of setting an arbitrary accounting period and of looking only 
at those items that happen to have been created with nominally-separate financing 
mechanisms.  The goal then becomes measuring whether there is a mismatch between the 
government’s aggregate long-term spending commitments and its aggregate long-term 
revenue streams.  In other words, we would like to have an analogue to the notion of a 
cash-flow periodic deficit that captures all present and future activities of a government.
1. The Fiscal Gap (FG) and Generational Accounting (GA)
One attempt to build such a long-term analytical model is called “Generational 
Accounting.”7 Responding to the political focus on annual cash-flow deficits, in the early 
1990’s the economist Laurence Kotlikoff and his frequent co-authors Alan J. Auerbach 
and Jagadeesh Gokhale developed a theory that was motivated by concerns about the 
long-term effects of federal fiscal commitments.  Importantly, moreover, they attempted 
not only to determine whether current projections of fiscal flows will balance but also to 
7 See Alan J., Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Generational Accounts: A 
Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting, 5 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 55 (David Bradford ed., 1991); 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend 
(1992); Lawrence Kotlikoff, From Deficit Delusion to Generational Accounting, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-
June 1993, at 104-05; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational 
Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. of Econ. Perspectives 73 (1994); Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff, Reply to Diamond’s and Cutler’s reviews of generational accounting, 50 National Tax Journal 
303 (1997); Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Willi Leibfritz, eds., Generational Accounting 
Around the World (1998); Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Policy, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 8163, March 2001, forthcoming in Handbook of Public Economics (2nd Ed.).
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determine whether the government’s treatment of different generations of its citizens was, 
in some meaningful way, fair.
An initial note of caution is, however, in order. Whatever its analytical merits and 
shortcomings (discussed in some detail below), the Generational Accounting approach 
would put an even greater constraint on legal analysts or anyone else who might propose 
a change in public policy.  No longer would it be enough to prove that a policy would not 
increase the current deficit; Kotlikoff  et al. offer opponents of government activism an 
even more powerful trump card.  Their approach requires not merely that there be enough 
money to pay for the program today, but it also requires that the program be “affordable” 
into the indefinite future, as measured by long-range budget forecasts.
Adding a political (and somewhat emotional) slant to the discussion, these 
analysts further suggest that a nything that is not affordable in this way is a transfer to the 
(voting) living generations from (politically defenseless) unborn generations.  If this 
approach is well-founded, of course, then the political implications should not be ignored 
merely because they might be unwelcome or inconvenient; but it raises the stakes in the 
analysis of this alternative method of measuring fiscal policy.
2. The FG/GA Baseline
The basic notion behind generational accounting is quite simple (though such 
conceptual simplicity makes the intractable measurement problems discussed below all 
the more frustrating).  If current spending and tax laws were to stay in effect in 
perpetuity, the flows of expenditures and revenues would vary depending on future 
economic growth, population changes, weather patterns, medical developments, etc. To 
measure the infinite-future Fiscal Gap (FG), one must make assumptions about the 
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directions and magnitudes of the most important of those future trends  and apply the 
accounting concept of net present value to discount all of those projected future 
expenditures and revenues into current dollar terms.  The resulting estimate, FG, tells us 
how much money the government would have to borrow today in order to pay for all of 
its future deficits in a lump sum.
Generational Accounting (GA) takes this one important step further.  Starting 
with the FG measure, GA provides estimates of the lifetime net tax rates for different 
generations implied by current fiscal policies.  Each generational cohort’s lifetime 
government-provided benefits are subtracted from its net taxes and divided by income.  
Hence, Kotlikoff and his co-authors claim that GA provides a way to measure whether 
current generations are being “fair” to those that will follow.
C. The Current State of the Literature and Policy Debates
Tax Notes—the periodical of record for tax practitioners, policymakers, and 
academics—has carried at least eight articles that in some way deal with GA since 1991, 
when the theory was first introduced.8 To date, the appearances of GA in the general 
8 Alan D. Viard, The Social Security Surplus, the Trust Fund, and the Federal Budget, 94 Tax Notes 
891 (2002); Sheldon D. Pollack, Professor Supports 'PAYGO' To Restrain Worst Impulses Of Both Parties, 
82 Tax Notes 1035 (1999); Daniel Shaviro, Understanding the Generational Challenge, 75 Tax Notes 714 
(1997); Karen C. Burke, VATs and Flat Taxes Reconsidered, 70 Tax Notes 899 (1996); Richard Goode & 
C. Eugene Steuerle, Generational Accounts and Fiscal Policy, 65 Tax Notes 1027 (1994); Barbara
Kirchheimer, Generational Accounting: Are We Soaking the Young? 62 Tax Notes 945 (1994); David M.
Cutler, Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend, 60 Tax Notes 361 
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legal literature have not been extensive,9 but Professor Daniel Shaviro of New York 
University Law School has written extensively in support of the argument that the 
(1993); J. Andrew Hoerner, NBER Conferees Discuss IRAs, Integration, Corporate Tax Shifts, 53 Tax 
Notes 878 (1991).
9 A Lexis search of all law reviews turned up eighteen citations to “generational accounting,” 
starting in 1993: Axel P. Gosseries, Symposium: Intergenerational Equity: What Do We Owe the Next 
Generations? 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 293 (2001); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, 
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000); Alan Newman, Incorporating 
the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform 
Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 Emory L.J. 487 (2000); Mary L. 
Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight Under The Government 
Performance And Results Act, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 751, (2000); Maria O'Brien Hylton, Evaluating the 
Case for Social Security Reform: Elderly Poverty, Paternalism and Private Pensions, 64 Brooklyn L. Rev. 
749 (1998); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1998); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the 
Democratization of Dynasty, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 873 (1997); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in 
Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2345 (1996); Peter Diamond, Generational Accounts and 
Generational Balance: An Assessment, 49 National Tax Journal 597 (1996); Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-
Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market 
and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration, 50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995); Jonathan Barry , 
Reconsidering the Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly: It's Time for the Elderly to Pay Their Fair Share, 
56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 589, 614 n.95 (1995)(Reprinted in 69 Tax Notes 485)(citing generally Kotlikoff, 
GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING, supra note __, but not explicitly discussing or endorsing the generational 
accounting framework); Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and Cooperative Dependencies: The Case for 
Children, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2217 (1995); Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer Mandate: 
Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 St. Louis L.J. 155 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, The UCLA Tax Policy 
Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1861 (1994); Evelyn Brody, Paying Back Your 
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FG/GA approach should be imported into legal analyses of Social Security policy and 
Medicare policy—and more generally into all legal analyses of fiscal policy.10 Finding 
that there is a long-term fiscal imbalance that makes “the current policy fiscally 
unsustainable,”11 Shaviro asserts that it is necessary to think about these issues through 
the lens of FG/GA12—and such an analysis, we learn, shows a grim future indeed.13
The stakes in this debate, therefore, could hardly be higher.  Anyone who wishes 
to write about Medicare or Social Security, and indeed anyone who might ever wish to 
Country through Income-Contingent Student Loans, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 449 (1994); Edith Brown Weiss, 
Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment, 102 Yale L.J. 2123 (1993); David Cutler, 
Review of Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend, 46 National Tax 
Journal 61 (1993).
While some of these references are merely pro forma (e.g., McCaffery, Garrett, Newman), and 
Kornhauser directly criticizes the theory, several of the articles (esp. Brody’s pieces and Forman’s article) 
appear to endorse GA.
10 Shaviro’s writing on this topic includes, in book-length form: Daniel Shaviro, Who Should Pay for 
Medicare? (2004); Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of Social Security Reform (2000); Daniel Shaviro, Do 
Deficits Matter? (1997).
11 Shaviro, supra note 8, at 715.
12 Id. at 716 (“Perhaps the best tool for enhancing our understanding of who wins and loses from 
alternative reforms is generational accounting….”)  Shaviro is not, however, explicitly wedded to FG/GA 
to the exclusion of all else.  Instead, he has suggested that we should use FG/GA as well as other theories to 
learn as much as we can from a variety of approaches.
13 Recently, Shaviro has more enthusiastically endorsed the Fiscal Gap measure of long-term fiscal 
balance and has not emphasized explicit Generational Accounting approaches.  See, e.g., Daniel N. 
Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an 
Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C.L.Rev. 1285 (2004).
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suggest that the government should spend money on any project, might plausibly be 
forced to contend with the implications of FG/GA.
If FG/GA lived up to its billing, of course, it would simply be good policy to use 
it as a starting point for fiscal analysis.  Unfortunately, it is not a neutral analytical tool 
and cannot be used dispassionately to assess the fiscal consequences of a government 
project, even by those who begin their analysis without a political agenda.  Instead, 
FG/GA is based on highly contestable assumptions, arbitrary analytical choices, and 
manipulable policy projections that fatally compromise most of its analytical value.  
Understanding the promise and limitations of FG/GA is essential for anyone who wishes 
to understand the current debate over government spending and taxation.
The debate, therefore, is not over whether the future matters—that is, this is not a 
debate between the grasshoppers and the ants.  Clearly, we must always think carefully 
about the future consequences of our fiscal policies.  The question is how to think about 
the future—what we would like to bequeath to future generations and how best to deliver 
it.
D. The Imperfect vs. the Fundamentally Flawed
Because we are attempting to peer into the future, any measure of the effects of 
fiscal policy will be imperfect.  The alternatives to FG/GA-style measures are, therefore, 
also imperfect.  Choosing among those imperfect alternatives is not easy. Given the 
available options, however, I argue that we should choose traditional deficit measures 
over the fundamentally flawed FG/GA-based measures.
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Traditional measures of the deficit can be perfected to some degree, and many 
official forecasts have extended the accounting period to a standard ten- year window.14
Acknowledging that there is always some value in learning what we can from a variety of 
approaches to analyzing fiscal policy, I nevertheless conclude that Fiscal Gaps and 
Generational Accounting are too often empty or even misleading measure s of future 
fiscal developments.
II. Traditional Fiscal Deficit Measures
Even the most casual observer of U.S. political debates cannot have missed the 
fact that our politicians are obsessed with “the deficit.”  After decades in which 
Republicans regularly attacked Democrats for their spendthrift ways, Democrats 
delighted in turning the tables in the 1980s, as Ronald Reagan presided over the largest 
nominal peacetime deficits in American history.  Undaunted, conservative Republicans 
insisted that they were the truly responsible fiscal custodians, culminating in the promise 
to balance the budget in 1994’s Contract With America.
Capitulating to the political heat generated by this headline-grabbing issue, former 
President Clinton announced in 1995 that he, too, was committed to balancing the 
budget.15  When the budget moved from deficit, to balance, and then to surplus under his 
14 See esp. William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag, Bush Administration Tax Policy:
Revenue and Budget Effects, Tax Notes, Oct. 4, 2004.
15 Indeed, Clinton’s pre-1994 actions showed that he was strongly predisposed to the balanced-
budget mantra, as he immediately jettisoned his proposals for long-term capital spending and instead 
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watch, Clinton never missed an opportunity to take credit for this “achievement.”  With 
their own party’s leadership having abandoned them, even the most progressive members 
of the Democratic Party became committed budget balancers.  Senator Russell Feingold, 
for example, eagerly pointed out that he opposed President Clinton’s proposed middle-
class tax cut in the early 1990’s.  “I was for deficit reduction.”16  Writing in 1998, 
Professor Nancy Staudt could reasonably conclude that, even if one believed in the 
importance of budget balance, it was unnecessary to pass a constitutional balanced-
budget amendment because politicians were overwhelmingly committed to that goal 
already.17
The politics of fiscal deficits can, however, change rapidly.  As recently as the 
late autumn of 2002, it seemed that there were no longer any major voices in American 
politics arguing in favor of deficit spending.18 As 2002 turned to 2003, though, the 
fiscal ink turned red again, and a new consensus arose that the return to short-run deficits 
was not a serious problem—but that long term deficits represent a virtual “cancer” eating 
pushed through a major tax increase.  (For those who approve of tax progressivity, however, one can at 
least note that Clinton’s tax bill was top-loaded.)
16 Matthew Rothschild, The Progressive Interview: Russ Feingold, The Progressive, May 2002, at 
31.
17 Staudt, note 3, supra.
18 There were, of course, some outside of the mainstream who opposed the orthodoxy, not all of 
whom were at the liberal end of the spectrum.  Former Congressman Jack Kemp, for example, was once the 
most prominent political advocate of so-called Supply Side Economics, which holds that low tax rates are 
much more important than balanced budgets in generating high economic growth rates.
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away at future prosperity.19 During the 2004 presidential campaign, finger-pointing 
about the deficit again rose to a fevered pitch.  The tentative consensus emerging from 
the presidential campaign was that cutting the deficit in half within five years was the 
best available policy, with disagreement only over which candidate could meet that 
goal.20  In the aftermath of the election, the administration’s budget proposals appear 
unlikely to reduce the annual deficit even by that much.21
To some degree, this political obsession with annual deficits is quite surprising, 
because the economic arguments in favor of deficit spending in various circumstances are 
well known and, to a large extent, uncontroversial among fiscal economists.22  While it is 
certainly possible to argue that, in spite of the economic case in favor of deficits in some 
circumstances, there is a stronger political case against them,23 it is at least worth 
remembering what the economic issues are.
19 See, e.g., Suddenly, Deficits Are No Big Deal, The New York Times, Nov. 18, 2002, at C1 
(quoting Kotlikoff).  See also David Leonhardt, That Big Fat Budget Deficit.  Yawn.  The New York Times, 
Feb. 8, 2004, Sec. 3, at 1.
20 Dustin Stamper, GOP Criticized as OMB Misses Midyear Budget Review Deadline, Tax Notes
Today, 2004 TNT 137-3 (Jul. 17, 2004) (“According to [Office of Management and Budget spokesman 
Chad] Kolton, Bush has offered the only credible plan to cut the deficit in half over the next five years. 
Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Sen. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts has pledged to equal 
that feat if he is elected, but each side has taken issue with the other's numbers.”)
21 Edmund L. Andrews, Trim Deficit?  Only if Bush Uses Magic, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2005, at C1.
22 See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really—I Mean, Really—a Burden? in James S. 
Rock, ed., Debt and the Twin Deficits Debate, at 209-25, 1991.
23 Id. at 224 (arguing that, even though the deficits of the 1980’s and early 1990’s were relatively 
minor, there could be no political peace unless everyone agreed to balance the budget).
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In addition, the discussion below highlights measurement problems that could be 
relatively easily changed to the benefit of public debate.  Without even reaching the 
question of Fiscal Gap/Generational Accounting vs. traditional deficit measures, 
analytical clarity could be improved through some relatively non-controversial 
adjustments to our measurements and our rhetoric.
A. Preliminary Concepts
Economists differentiate between stock variables and flow variables.  The 
difference between the two has to do with the passage of time.  Stock variables can be 
measured at a moment in time, while flow variables are only meaningful per unit of time.  
Thus, distance is a stock variable, while speed (miles per hour, for example) is a flow 
variable.  In economics, common stock/flow distinctions include prices (stock) versus 
inflation (flow) and wealth (stock) versus income (flow).
1. Debt and Deficits
In government accounting, debt is a stock variable, because it measures the total 
amount of money at any given moment that a government owes its creditors.  The deficit 
is a flow variable, measuring the net amount of new borrowing that the government has 
engaged in during the course of a year (or any other unit of time).  Deficits are, properly 
measured, the change in debt as time passes.
Importantly, the total amount of federal government debt that exists at a given 
moment is also tautologically equal to the total number of dollars of Treasury securities 
in circulation at any moment.  Since the federal government borrows money by selling
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Treasury securities, the face value of those outstanding securities is equal to the National 
Debt.
Here, however, is one of the first instances where reality and theory diverge.  The 
different agencies of the federal government often hold each other’s debt instruments, so 
the net federal debt is lower than the number of bonds that have been issued but not
redeemed.  The difference is not trivial.  While the infamous “National Debt Clock” on 
display in several major cities (the ever-rising digital readout of the nation’s supposed 
indebtedness, expressed both in the aggregate and as “Your Family’s Share”) showed an 
outstanding federal debt of over $7.1 trillion in April 2004,24 just over $4 trillion of that 
total was held outside of the federal government’s own offices.25  This was why the 
National Debt Clock did not initially decline when the federal government ran surpluses 
in the late twentieth century.  Even though the government was extinguishing debt held 
by the public, the total number of bonds in existence was not going down, so “the 
national debt”—by that meaningless measure—was not shrinking.
2. Dollars vs. Percentages
The common practice of expressing debt and deficits in total dollars rather than as 
percentages of national income can also be highly misleading.  Politicians in the late 
1980s talked of “$200 billion deficits as far as the eye can see” as if that was an 
unimaginable calamity.  In fact, given that nominal GDP doubles roughly every twelve 
24 U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt_clock/ (visited April 7, 2004).
25 Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table D.3 (Debt Outstanding by Sector), March 
4, 2004.
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years, $200 billion annual deficits would be trivial in relatively short order.26  Referring 
to deficits in nominal dollar terms also makes deficits in later years look larger than they 
really are, making references to “record-setting” deficits an empty description.27
In the U.S., deficits as a percentage of GDP peaked in the mid-1980s at roughly 
6%, and the publicly-held debt peaked at around the same time at 60% of GDP.  This 
was, of course, only the recent peak and was not even close to the 125% debt level 
reached at the end of World War II, when we wisely spent enormous sums of borrowed 
money to finance the war against the Axis powers.  This ratio had steadily fallen to the 
point where it was below 50% by the early 1980’s, and then rose for over a decade before 
falling again in the late 1990’s and early in the new century.  The current return to deficit 
26 In the first quarter of 1984, for example, U.S. GDP was $3.8 trillion, meaning that a $200 billion 
deficit was equal to more than 5¼ % of GDP.  Twenty years later, with GDP in the first quarter of 2004 
nearing $11.5 trillion, a $200 billion deficit would be under 1¾ % of GDP.  United States Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product 
<http://bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y> (Visited July 5, 2004; Last Revised on June 
25, 2004).
27 See, e.g., Dustin Stamper, GOP Criticized as OMB Misses Midyear Budget Review Deadline, Tax 
Notes Today, 2004 TNT 137-3 (Jul. 17, 2004) (“House Budget Committee ranking minority member John 
M. Spratt Jr., D-S.C. … said even the new deficit figure, which Democrats estimate to be in excess of $425 
billion, is record-setting.”  See also Louis Uchitelle, It’s the Economy, Right?  Guess Again.  The New 
York Times, Jul. 5, 2004, Sec. 3, at 1 (describing plans “to cut the deficit in half . . . from its projected 
record level of more than $450 billion in the current fiscal year”).  A $450 billion annual deficit in 2004 is 
roughly 3.9% of GDP—not even close to the post-WWII record of 6.0% in 1983, and tied only for the 
eighth-largest deficits in the last twenty-five years.  
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spending finds projected deficits at about 4.2% of GDP in 2004 ($477 billion), and the 
federal debt at 38.2% ($4,385 billion).28
3. Federal vs. State and Local
A third measurement issue carries more direct implications for policy debates.  
Typically, commentators separate the federal debt and deficit from the state and local 
fiscal positions.  Since the state and local sector tended until very recently to run 
aggregate operating surpluses, the decision to exclude the state and local sector when 
discussing the “government” deficit and debt naturally made the situation look worse—
while the current situation of chronic state deficits is ignored by federal measures of 
borrowing.  Foreign economists view this practice as nothing less than bizarre, because 
the macroeconomic consequences of debt and deficits surely do not depend on the
hierarchical level of the government entity that is doing the borrowing.29
In addition to being logically incoherent, this practice has perverse policy affects
as well.  When national politicians view their job as reducing the federal deficit or debt, 
28 Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current Budget Projections (March Baseline Projections), 
March 2004.
29 Wynne Godley, Seven Unsustainable Processes: Medium-Term Prospects and Policies for the 
United States and the World.  Special Report: The Levy Economics Institute (revised Oct. 5, 2000), at 2 
(“In the United States the public discussion of fiscal policy concentrates almost exclusively on the 
operations of the federal government. Yet state and local governments account for about a third of all 
public expenditure and taxes; moreover, their budgets are generally in surplus so that these authorities are 
now in substantial credit . . . .  In what follows, government inflows and outflows--and debts--will always 
refer to the operations of the "general government" (the combined federal, state, and local governments).”)
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they are tempted either to ignore the consequences of their decisions on lower levels of 
government or even deliberately to shift spending obligations downward.30  Indeed, this 
seems to be a primary explanation for the fiscal crisis in the states over the last few years.
B. Cash-Flow Deficit Measures
While the issues discussed briefly above have important implications for 
discussing the status of fiscal policy in the United States, the discussion that follows 
attempts to follow the current norms in describing deficit measures.  Even within the 
federal-only measures, however, there are significant disagreements about what is the 
true measure of fiscal policy.
1. On-Budget and Off-Budget
Even if one looks only at the federal government, the annual deficit is more 
manipulable than it might seem.  A spending program can exist in a netherworld outside 
of the official budget simply by act of Congress.  There need be no economic rationale 
for the decision.  The 1991 Gulf War was carried off budget, for example, and the current 
operations in Iraq are being funded by emergency appropriations. By far the biggest off-
budget item, of course, is the Social Security system.  The current surplus in that system 
(approximately $161 billion in 2004, or 1.4% of GDP) makes the total deficit smaller 
than the on-budget deficit ($638 billion, or 5.6% of GDP), but when Social Security starts 
30 See, for example, Kevin Sack, States Expecting to Lose Billions From Repeal of U.S. Estate Tax, 
N.Y. Times, Jun. 21, 2001.
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to run deficits after the next decade or so, the on-budget deficit will be smaller than the 
total deficit.31
The debate about whether the Social Security Trust Fund has any meaning is, of 
course, an important factor in determining whether the on-budget or total deficit is the 
proper measure.  Because I conclude that the total deficit is the better of the two, in that it 
measures the amount of money that the federal government is draining from the financial 
markets in a given year, I will focus on that measure of the deficit and possible ways to 
improve it.32
A fuller discussion of Social Security’s financing and long-term prospects appears 
in Section III below.
2. Cyclical Adjustment
For macroeconomists, one of the most important measurement issues in deficit 
accounting is adjustment of the deficit for changes in the health of the economy.  When 
the business cycle turns, tax receipts and government expenditures naturally change along 
31 All estimates in this paragraph are from Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current Budget 
Projections (March Baseline Projections), March 2004.  As the data discussed in Section III below 
indicate, however, these estimates have been subsequently revised.  The contingent nature of the estimates 
should be borne in mind throughout this analysis.
32 For a persuasive argument that the Social Security system should not be seen as an individualized 
benefit plan but rather as a redistributive fiscal program, see, Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Federal 
Tax Burden on Labor Income, 98 Tax Notes 563, 574 (Jan. 27, 2003) (citing generally Patricia E. Dilley, 
Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Privatization.  41 B.C. L. Rev. 
975 (2000)).
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with the GDP.  Recessions bring lower revenues and higher expenditures, and boom 
times do the opposite.  When comparing deficits at two points in time, therefore, it is 
important to ask, “What would the deficit be today if the economy were fully healthy?”
What it means to be “fully healthy” is, of course, a matter of contention.  
Nevertheless, there is a widely-accepted measure of the cyclically-adjusted deficit known 
as the Standardized-Budget Deficit, computed by determining the flows of revenues and 
expenditures if the unemployment rate were at its trend rate.  In 2003, because of the 
lingering effects of the recession, the unadjusted total deficit was $375 billion (3.4% of 
GDP), while the Standardized-Budget Deficit was $313 billion (2.8% of GDP).33
Failing to adjust the deficit for cyclical effects is likely to lead to policy errors .  
First, it confuses cause and effect.  Improvements in the economy cause decreases in the 
non-adjusted deficit; but decreases in the cyclically-adjusted deficit (all else constant) 
cause the economy to decline.   Because of this, it causes perverse policy moves, as a 
worsening economy causes the deficit to rise, such that policymakers who attempt to 
reduce the deficit with further cuts in spending (and perhaps increases in taxes) will only 
further weaken the economy.  President Bush’s symbolic refusal to spend money that 
Congress had allocated, noted above, clearly demonstrates this perversity.34
Nor is this failure to comprehend simple macroeconomics confined to the United 
States.  The Japanese economy went into its first of several severe downturns in 1989.  
By 1996, with the domestic economy still in deep trouble, Japanese policymakers relied 
33 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005 to 2014, 
App. F, Tab. F-12 and F-13, January 2004.
34 See note 5 above and accompanying text.
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on more budget-cutting and tax increases to improve the economy—the macroeconomic 
equivalent of “bleeding” a patient to restore her to health.  Yet policymakers there and 
elsewhere remained puzzled by their patients’ continued ill health.35 Now, “many 
economists believe that Japan’s long stagnation in the 1990s largely reflected timid 
policymakers unwilling to boldly use the levers of fiscal and monetary policy.”36
The practical consequences of failing to adjust for the business cycle are 
especially severe for state and local governments, most of which operate under 
(modified) balanced budget requirements.  When the economy is strong (which means 
that, by definition, workers are scarce because their prospects are so good in the private 
sector), states flush with money compete with prosperous companies for workers and 
other economic resources.  Roads are torn up and re-built precisely when the disruption 
from such projects is the most damaging, as the overburdened highways are filled with 
vehicles carrying the evidence of economic prosperity.  Then, when the economy 
35
“Exasperation as Tight Budgets Don't Deliver Growth...” Nomura Securities Research Report, 
August, 1996 (“Low inflation and trimming of fiscal deficits have always been regarded as a foolproof 
recipe for economic growth.  However, that conventional wisdom has been turned upside down in the past 
few years, as politicians in developed economies have grown exasperated by the failure of high growth to 
materialize despite their belt tightening efforts.  Average real GDP growth in the major industrialized 
nations was 4.0-4.5% in the 1970s, and 3.0-3.5% in the 1980s- but in the 1990smany believe the figure will 
be a meager 2.0%.”)  Just who it was who regarded deficit cutting as a “foolproof recipe for economic 
growth” is unclear, but their identity is probably best kept a secret.
36 Christopher Farrell, Capitalism’s Savior, Business Week, Apr. 12, 2004, at 20.
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weakens, states see their tax revenues decline, lay off workers, and leave highways in 
disrepair.  It would be difficult to design a more perverse system.37
3. Unfunded Liabilities
The closest one comes in the traditional deficit debates to the central issues of 
long-term budgeting (which are the focus of the Fiscal Gap/Generational Accounting
approach described below) is the discussion of “unfunded liabilities.”  The basic idea is 
that government projects that involve spending in the future can be thought of as 
liabilities that must be accounted for when looking forward.  This sensible observation, 
though, can only be useful inasmuch as projects have dedicated financing.  If a high 
school is built with proceeds from a bond sale, for example, the liability is funded if the 
school district commits the funds in future budgets to cover the bond payments.  
Otherwise, the project is unfunded. Since most government programs are not financed 
through dedicated funds, of course, most projects are unfunded liabilities.  The Interior 
Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, etc., are all unfunded, and they will almost 
certainly continue to be so for as long as they last.
Estimates of unfunded liabilities are highly responsive to changes in the law, and 
their size can dwarf the rest of the budget.  The estimate of unfunded liabilities in the 
Social Security system after the change in withholding taxes in the early 1980’s, for 
example, swung from several trillion dollars in unfunded liability to several trillion 
37 This is not to say that highways are the be-all and end-all of economic spending.  In this analysis, 
they are simply the most intuitive example of public spending on infrastructure.
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dollars in long-term surplus.38 FG/GA is arguably an improvement on the arbitrary 
nature of these estimates, as I discuss below; but its other shortcomings ultimately make 
it an unappealing alternative.
4. Extended Budget Projections
All of the budget measures discussed above are calculated in annual terms.  It is 
possible, of course, to use a different arbitrary time period in such an analysis.  During 
the Clinton Administration, it became common to provide ten-year projections of 
budgets, to allow policymakers to look into the relatively foreseeable future and 
determine whether a budget or tax measure was likely to become more or less 
manageable over time.  The current Bush Administration has sometimes issued five-year 
projections rather than ten year projections, a move that has generated suspicion that the 
full costs of their policy proposals are “back-loaded.”
It is, of course, possible to back-load even on a ten-year horizon; and within a ten-
year horizon, it is also possible to play games for different political purposes, such as the 
Bush Administration’s proposal to “encourage savers to move money from one type of 
individual retirement account to another, thus increasing tax receipts by $14.6 billion 
over the next four years—the period over which the president promises to reduce the 
deficit—while costing the government twice as much money in the following six 
years.”39
38 See Neil H. Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
39 Floyd Norris, Games Politicians Play: More Tax Cuts as U.S. Faces Large Deficits, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 11, 2005, at C1.
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The arbitrary nature of these cutoffs is, as discussed in the next section, a strong 
argument in favor of adopting an infinite-horizon model along the lines of the FG/GA
approach.  Nevertheless, because of the critical problems in lengthening the time horizon, 
the ten-year projections are probably the best compromise available.  This point will be 
taken up further below.
C. Effects on Consumption and Investment
The payoff for making these adjustments to the measurement of the fiscal deficit 
comes in analyzing the effects of current deficits on the use of society’s productive 
resources (labor, machinery, factories, land, etc.).  If the government hires resources to 
build or produce goods and services, and if those resources would have been used to 
produce something of value to private citizens, then the government has “crowded out” 
private activity.  If the government crowds out private consumption, then there is at worst 
no effect on future generations, because private consumption would not have benefited 
future generations in any case.  In such a situation, the government can make future 
generations better off if it replaces private consumption with public investment, or it can 
simply substitute one kind of consumption for another—leaving future generations 
unaffected.
The serious concern, of course, is that the government will not crowd out private 
consumption but will, instead, crowd out private investment.  If the government wastes 
money that would have gone toward private investment in productive equipment, for 
example, then the future standard of living of the country is compromised.  In fact, even 
if the government invests resources in productive assets, it can still make matters worse if 
the assets it crowds out would have been more productive than the government’s 
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investment projects.  What is often forgotten, however, is the other possibility—that the 
government might crowd out a private investment project with a public investment 
project that is even more productive.  Rather than building a strip mall, for example, 
resources might be used to build a children’s hospital.40
While there is no precise way to know the exact nature of these tradeoffs, the 
fundamental question could not be more important: What effect will the government’s 
decisions today have on the economy’s productive capacity—and thus the real standard 
of living—tomorrow?  It is here that our concern for future generations should be 
concentrated.
D. Annual and Ten-Year Deficit Estimates
In summary, if we are to improve public discussion of the government’s fiscal 
situation, the least radical alternative would be to adopt a cyclically-adjusted deficit 
(preferably for the entire government sector, though that appears unlikely).  Such a 
measure, while still imperfect, would allow policymakers to focus on the possible 
crowding out caused by its annual fiscal policies.
Medium-term forecasts are also valuable.  While imperfect, such measures 
provide policymakers with useful guidance in looking past the current fiscal year. The 
use of annual and 10-year estimates of fiscal deficits, moreover, will allow policymakers 
to see the effects of their decisions on the path of the economy during the time period 
40 Although the discussion here focuses on spending projects, taxing decisions can be analyzed in 
precisely the same fashion.  Every aspect of the tax code has the potential to change consumption decisions 
into investment decisions, investments into consumption, less productive investments into more productive 
investments, etc.
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over which they have the most direct control.  The effect of current fiscal policies on the 
standard of living of future generations arises most directly from the effect of borrowing 
on private investment; so policymakers could honor their future commitments by 
deciding how much borrowing they are willing to vote for during the ensuing ten years.
Admittedly, having longer-term estimates available can potentially help keep 
politicians more honest, by preventing them from playing games with arbitrary time 
periods, as described above.  We do not, of course, face a stark all-or-nothing choice 
between standard deficit measures alone or long-term estimates alone.  As argued below, 
however, the knowledge that can be gained from the longer-term measures is so tentative 
that they should only be used if they send an unmistakable signal that is invariant to 
plausible changes in assumptions about the future.
III. Social Security and Long-Term Solvency
Given the intense focus in popular discourse on Social Security as a separate 
program,41 it is important to describe the structure of that program in light of its history 
and goals.  Such an analysis permits a deeper look at the real issues behind the notion of 
program-specific solvency (i.e., will Social Security go “bust,” as President Bush 
claims?42) as well as the broader effects of Social Security’s financing on the rest of the 
budget and on the economy.
41 See, e.g., Karen Tumulty and Eric Roston, Social Security: Is There Really a Crisis? Time, Jan. 
24, 2005, at 22 (including a series of six related articles)
42 Richard Stevenson, For Bush, a Long Embrace of Social Security Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 
2005, at § 1, p. 1 (“Social Security ‘will be bust in 10 years unless there are some changes,’ [Bush] said.”)
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A. Supporting People in Retirement, Infancy, and Otherwise
The basic economic problem posed by retirees is that they no longer produce 
goods and services by working, but they continue to consume goods and services while 
they are still alive.  Indeed, this concept extends to children and the disabled as well, such 
that, at any given moment, those who are working must produce sufficient goods and 
services to satisfy not only themselves but everyone who is not working for any reason.  
Total U.S. employment in January 2005 was just over 140 million workers,43 while the 
total population was nearing 300 million,44 meaning that every worker is supporting 
herself and slightly more than one other person, on average.
The methods of providing consumption to non-workers fall into several simple 
categories.  Direct provision of consumption simply involves having some workers pay 
for the goods and services consumed by a non-worker.  Family arrangements are the 
prototype of this method, which is in part what the Social Security system was designed 
to replace, because some non-workers had no families (or less economically prosperous 
families) on which to rely.
Absent familial connection and absent government transfer programs, the two 
remaining basic methods of financing non-workers’ consumption involve saving during 
43 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, Feb. 4, 2005, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (visited Mar. 1, 2005).
44 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Population Estimates 2000 to 2004, Table 1, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (visited Mar. 1, 2005) (population estimate for July 
1, 2004 of 293,655,404)
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working years and consuming during retirement years.  While structurally quite distinct, 
these methods can be seen to boil down to precisely the same tradeoffs.
1. Individual Savings Accounts and Social Security Contributions
The government can assist workers in providing for their retirement years by 
structuring contract and property rules (and sometimes tax rules) that allow workers to 
save part of their incomes in interest-bearing accounts.  This can range from simple 
voluntary savings accounts to employer-matched, tax-preferred retirement savings plans 
(such as 401(k) accounts and Individual Retirement Accounts).  No matter the contractual 
complexities, the purpose is to give workers the confidence that their funds will be 
legally protected and available when they decide to stop working.
The Social Security system, on the other hand, looks quite different.  There, 
workers reduce their current consumption not by making deposits into savings accounts 
but by making contributions to the system through payroll taxes.  The result is not an 
individual account with funds growing at a market-set interest rate, but a programmatic 
guarantee that the worker’s contributions today will be rewarded with benefits paid by 
future workers when current workers are retired.
2. National Saving
From the standpoint of the aggregate economy, these formally different financing 
methods are indistinguishable.  Imagine a country in which there is one retiree and two 
workers.  The retiree is consuming $1000 per month of goods and services.  The workers 
are both consuming $2000 per month.  Shared equally, each worker must be made to 
produce $2500 per month and give $500 units per month to the retiree.
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The method of financing cannot change this fundamental arithmetic.  If the retiree 
is financing consumption by drawing down a savings account, he or she would withdraw 
$1000 a month, which would count as negative saving.  Simultaneously, the workers 
would be forbearing from the opportunity to consume all of the goods and services that 
their incomes could purchase, putting $500 each per month into their retirement accounts 
and leaving $1000 worth of goods available for the retiree to purchase.  If the amounts do 
not balance (i.e., if the retiree tries to buy more goods than the workers are willing to 
forsake), and if the total amount of goods and services is already determined, then prices 
would have to change to balance the system.  Crucially, though, the net amount of annual 
saving in such a system is precisely zero, because the retiree’s dissaving will exactly 
offset the workers’ saving.
A direct financing method like Social Security’s achieves the same result.  In any 
time period (such as a year), workers divert $500 each from current consumption to allow 
the retiree to consume $1000 of goods and services.  Neither the retiree nor the workers 
would have any official saving or dissaving, but the government’s accounts would show 
$1000 in total taxes (national saving) and $1000 in retirement benefits (national 
dissaving), again with a perfect offset.  The form differs, but the macroeconomic
substance is the same.
B. Long-Term Balance and Imbalance
If the simple world described above were to continue in perpetuity, there would 
be no long-range funding problems and no macroeconomic effects created by different
methods of financing.  If there were already a Social Security-like funding mechanism in 
place, there would be no reason to change to any other mechanism.  Each year’s benefits 
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would be available to retirees because workers would be consuming less than they could 
otherwise purchase.
The world described above, however, assumes a stable demographic environment 
in which workers pass into retirement and are replaced by an appropriate number of new 
workers.  That assumption is, of course, not true for the current U.S. retirement system.  
The current difficulty with the Social Security system arose because of concern over the 
retirement of the Baby Boom.45 One consequence of the long-term demographic changes 
is, of course, that the number of workers per retiree will soon change dramatically.  
Starting in the mid-1970’s through the present, the ratio of workers to retirees has 
fluctuated between 3.2 and 3.4, but that number is projected to fall to 2.6 in 2020 and to 
level off at 1.9 starting in 2065.46
While this decline might seem to suggest that there is no way to save the system 
short of significant benefit cuts,47 the worker-to-retiree ratio is only half the story.  If, as 
projected, the average productivity of each worker rises by enough to offset the decline in 
45 For a brief summary of the recent history of the Social Security system, see Neil H. Buchanan, 
The Trillion Dollar Breach of Contract: Social Security and the American Worker, FindLaw’s Writ, Aug.
30, 2001, <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010830_buchanan.html>
46 Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund and the Federal Disability 
Insurance Trust Fund,  Annual Report, at 47, Tab. IV.B2 (2004) (hereinafter “Trustees’ Report”). 
47 For example, a recent letter to the New York Times treated the workers-to-retiree ratio as the only 
relevant datum for understanding long-term solvency.  Karen Burke, Social Security: We Count On It, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 10, 2004, at A40 (“When benefits exceed the payroll tax receipts … , demography is destiny: a 
ballooning cohort of retirees will be dependent upon a relatively stable working-age population.”).
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the relative number of workers producing goods, then the demographic change need not 
portend lower standards of living for either future workers or future retirees.48
1. The Trust Funds
When a government-run retirement system is in annual balance, there is no need 
to carry over balances or to borrow in any given year.  In 1983, the Social Security 
system was changed to deliberately collect more in taxes every year than would be paid 
in benefits, while the Baby Boom was still in its prime earning years.49  Then, when the 
Baby Boomers worked their way through retirement, the system would deliberately be 
underfunded, with benefits exceeding revenues for several more decades.  During the fat 
years, the excess tax revenues would be credited to a trust fund, and in the lean years, the 
deficit in the system would be counted as a withdrawal from the funds.50
This accounting convention was, of course, consciously set up only as a 
bookkeeping matter.  In any given year, given that the rest of the government’s budget 
would almost certainly be in deficit, the excess from Social Security would finance all or 
part of that deficit.  In 2004, for example, the non-Social Security deficit was $567.4 
billion, while Social Security ran a surplus of $151.1 billion.51
48 For some simple numerical examples of this phenomenon, see Robert Eisner, No Need to Sacrifice 
Seniors or Children, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at A10.
49 See Buchanan, note 45.
50 See generally Paul Krugman, Confusions About Social Security, The Economists’ Voice, Jan. 
2005.
51 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015, 
App. F, Tab. 1, Jan. 25, 2005.
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It should be remembered, moreover, that there is no aggregate difference between 
having the Treasury directly use the annual Social Security surplus and having the 
Treasury borrow more on the financial markets while Social Security lends on those same 
financial markets.  Either way, in 2004, the federal government would have drawn a net
$412.1 billion from the financial markets.52
2. Turning Points in the Trust Funds
Since the trust funds were created to deal with the large, but gradual, shifts in the 
financing of the nation’s retirement system, the system was designed to go through two 
phases.  In the first phase, the Social Security system would run surpluses that grew from 
year to year.  At some point, revenues would stop growing faster than benefits, such that 
there would still be annual surpluses, but they would shrink inexorably each year.  The 
second phase would see the emergence and growth of annual deficits, followed by 
gradually shrinking deficits trending toward annual balance.
The date when the system moves from the first phase to the second phase is, from 
the standpoint of 1983, not particularly interesting.  It is simply an artifact of the system’s 
design.  There had to be a turning point, and it would happen somewhere between when 
the trust funds began and when the system returned to annual balance.  This was part of 
the plan, not a crisis date.
In addition, with the system no longer designed to generate annual balance, the 
possibility arose that the system would not only be financially imbalanced in specific 
years but also as measured in the aggregate over all future years.  There was thus a
52 Id.  Figures do not add up due to rounding error and miscellaneous items.
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possibility that the system might not perfectly hit a “smooth landing,” as it were, with 
benefits exceeding revenues for more years than originally planned.  Again, this was 
implicit in the system’s design from the beginning.  If the surplus years did not last as 
long (or were not as bountiful) as originally projected, or if the deficit years lasted longer 
(or were leaner) than projected, then there would be a date at which the trust fund would 
go negative.
3. Are the Turning Points Important?
The important point to recognize is that those two dates—the turning point from 
annual surpluses to annual deficits, and the date of possible trust fund depletion—are not 
dates at which something dramatic must change in the system.  The year before the first 
turning point would have a very small annual surplus, and the year after would have a 
very small deficit; but the difference between those two years would not be meaningfully 
larger than the difference between any other two- year span in that era.
The lack of drama is even more pronounced regarding the date of possible trust 
fund depletion.53  There, Social Security would be running annual deficits both before 
and after the depletion dates, and those deficits would be of relatively equal size.  Unless 
the depletion date arrives much earlier than anticipated, in fact, the year after depletion 
would actually see a somewhat smaller deficit than the year before depletion.
The decades-long maturation and eventual passing of the Baby Boom generation, 
therefore, does not cause sudden shifts that must automatically throw a system out of 
53 This assumes that the law allows continued borrowing after a depletion date.  See the discussion 
below.
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balance.  Nor need this evolution create any specific dates when a crisis occurs.  The 
dates that we might focus on are artifacts of the system, not points of real economic 
interest.  The important economic issue is, instead, whether the long-term balances or 
imbalances will lead to unfortunate consequences.  It is long-term trends that matter, not 
the dates associated with specific turning points.  The political discussion, unfortunately, 
has tended to focus almost exclusively on those turning points.
C. Competing Analyses of Long-Term Solvency
Two government agencies, the Social Security Administration and the 
Congressional Budget Office, provide regular analyses of the long- term finances of the 
system.  The most recent Trustees Report from the Social Security Administration
provides estimates that are, on the whole, less optimistic than those provided by CBO.
The Trustees use three sets of economic assumptions to generate their forecasts, whereas 
CBO provides a mid-range estimate and a probability distribution of possible alternative 
paths.54  Each agency focuses on the intermediate assumptions when summarizing their 
findings.  Differences arising from these assumptions are noted below.
1. The First Turning Point
As noted above, the point at which the system turns from annual surpluses to 
annual deficits is interesting more as a symbolic matter than as a real one.  Even so, 
because public discussion has begun to focus on these issues, both agencies have 
provided estimates of this turning point. The Trustees estimate that, under their 
54 Congressional Budget Office, The Outlook for Social Security, at 31 (June 2004) (hereinafter 
“CBO 2004”).
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art20
Page 37
intermediate set of assumptions, the system will swing to deficit from surpluses in 
2018.55  Under the most pessimistic assumptions, the turning point comes in 2014, and 
under the more optimistic assumptions, the turning point is in 2020.
The CBO’s estimates are not much different.  In its 2004 report, CBO estimated 
(under what it views as the most reasonable economic assumptions) that the turning point 
would come in 2019.56  Only seven months after issuing that estimate, though, CBO’s 
revised estimates put the turning point a year later, in 2020.57
Given that the first turning point is driven by the retirement of the Baby Boomers, 
which is not very far in the future, it is not surprising that CBO and the Trustees provide 
similar estimates.  Their differing estimates of the depletion date, though, bear some 
consideration.
2. Trust Fund Depletion
The Trustees’ forecasts of the date of trust fund depletion are 2031 under the most 
pessimistic assumptions and 2042 under the mid-range assumptions, whereas the trust 
fund is never depleted at all under the more optimistic assumptions.58  CBO’s mid-range 
estimate projects that the trust fund will be depleted in 2052, ten years later than the 
Trustees’ intermediate estimate.59
55 Trustees’ Report at 8.
56 CBO 2004 at vii.
57 Congressional Budget Office, Updated Long-Term Projections for Social Security (Jan. 2005) 
(hereinafter “CBO Update”), http://cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6064&sequence=0.
58 Trustees Report at 15, Fig. II.D7.
59 CBO Update at 1.
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CBO presents an analysis of the difference between their projections and the 
Trustees’ projections. While CBO relies on the Trustees’ demographic assumptions, it 
uses different economic assumptions.60 “Some of those differences in assumptions 
improve the financial outlook for Social Security and others worsen it.”61  Specifically, 
CBO assumes that real earnings will grow at a 1.3% annual rate, as opposed to the 
Trustees’ assumption of 1.1% annual growth.  CBO assumes an average real interest rate 
of 3.3%, higher than the Trustees’ assumed 3.0% rate.  CBO also assumes lower inflation 
(2.2% per year against 2.8%) and unemployment (5.2% vs. 5.5%).62
It is not my purpose here to delve into the vagaries of economic forecasting.  
Instead, it is important simply to point out how widely varying the long- term projections 
are based on relatively minor (and utterly defensible) differences in economic 
assumptions.
D. A Key Question: What is “Current Law”?
As described in part IV below, the baseline used to compute the Fiscal Gap (and 
thus Generational Accounts) is “current law.”  That is, the mental exercise involves 
asking what would happen if current law were completely unchanged forever.  In the 
context of Social Security, however, there is a conflict between two aspects of existing 
law.  The benefits and revenues anticipated under current law, under the intermediate and 
most pessimistic assumptions, lead to a point at which the trust fund is depleted.  If the 
60 CBO 2004 at 29.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29, Tab. A-1.
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system is not allowed to borrow to cover full benefits after that point, benefits must be 
cut immediately, by 22% starting in 2053, under CBO’s assumptions.63
On the other hand, if the scheduled benefits continue to be paid after the depletion 
date, the Social Security system continues to run annual deficits unless and until it comes 
back into balance or surplus.  Indeed, CBO’s updated estimates changed the label of these
two scenarios.  The “scheduled benefits” scenario remains in place, but the “trust-fund 
financed” scenario has now become the “current law” scenario.64
Under the assumption that benefits will continue to be paid even after trust fund 
depletion, the Trustees estimate that the aggregate Social Security gap over the 75-year 
period from 2004-78 is $3.7 trillion, while the gap over the infinite future is $10.4 
trillion.65 These rather dramatic differences highlight just how artificial is the “current 
law” assumption. The current law that CBO assumes actually provides a less pessimistic 
forecast, because Social Security benefits must be cut absent intervention by 
policymakers.66  The more dramatic measures of long-term imbalance, on the other hand, 
are based on the assumption that a future Congress will prevent such automatic cuts.  
Further discussion of this issue is provided below.
63 CBO Update at 1.
64 Id.
65 Trustees’ Report at 58.  Note that $10.4 trillion is only 1.2% of GDP over the infinite future.  Id.
66 Because all spending laws require the appropriation of funds, but no appropriation has been 
enacted to permit borrowing by Social Security after the trust fund has been depleted, the system will be 
forced to cut benefits to the level supported by incoming revenues.  The law is silent, however, on how the 
cuts must be made.  While CBO assumes across-the-board cuts, see CBO Update, Figs. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 
Tab. 2-1, there is no statutory authority for that position.  Here, therefore, there is no current law at all.
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IV. Fiscal Gaps and Generational Accounting
The Fiscal Gap/Generational Accounting approach is built upon some very 
appealing foundational arguments and uses an apparatus similar to that described in 
Section III regarding long-term Social Security forecasts.  First, as noted above, deficit 
accounting is arbitrary, because there is nothing special about a year as the unit of 
analysis.67 Second, even without  any political games, there is no good analytical reason 
to assess government programs on an annual basis.  Projects that last longer than a year 
should be analyzed in their relevant time frame.  Surely, a year is far too short a time in 
which to measure meaningfully the impact on the economy of the vast majority of 
government programs and tax policies.
Of course, once one realizes that a year is arbitrary, one must also recognize that 
there is no non-arbitrary alternative.  The infinite future is out there, and perhaps the best 
way to proceed is to use the simple financial concept of net present value discounting to 
67
  As above, arbitrarily aiming to balance annual books can introduce its own set of bizarre games.  
After taking office in 2001, the second Bush administration changed the national accounts such that some 
corporate tax revenues would be credited in October 2001 rather than in September of that year.  Because 
the federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30, this move reduced the 
(then-projected) surplus for fiscal 2001 and increased it for fiscal 2002.  This gamesmanship came to light 
after the 2001 tax cut was passed, when it appeared that the on-budget surplus might actually slip into 
deficit for the first time in several years.  Democrats were quick to accuse the new administration of fiscal 
irresponsibility, and the administration quickly assured everyone that the on-budget surplus would still be 
$8 billion.  In a $10 trillion economy with a $2 trillion budget, the idea that we can predict an $8 billion
surplus—less than one half of one percent of spending—stretches credulity.  Such a small number is little 
more than a rounding error.
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bring all future receipts and expenditures into one current estimate. This approach has an 
added benefit in that it avoids the issue noted earlier of whether a program has a 
dedicated financing mechanism.  While it arguably makes sense to compare the long-
term planned expenditures and expected receipts for something like the highway trust 
fund, the majority of government programs can only meaningfully be assessed in the 
aggregate, because most programs are not supported by their own tax regimes. 
A. Computing the Accounts
1. The Fiscal Gap
The fundamental analytical achievement of the generational accounting 
framework is its attempt to compute an aggregate, discounted federal deficit or surplus 
into the infinite future.68  Estimates generated using an FG/GA framework have been 
included in many federal budget documents starting more than ten years ago,69 and 
Professor Kotlikoff has provided a great deal of input over the years to the work of the 
Congressional Budget Office.
The basic logic of FG/GA is, as described above, based on the assumption that 
current law remains unchanged indefinitely (assuming, of course, that we know what 
current law is70).  What are the likely paths of government spending and tax receipts, 
68 Note, though, that this is still only a federal calculation.  If one were to adopt FG/GA as the 
preferred accounting framework, it would surely be desirable to extend it to the entire government sector.
69 See citations in Robert Haveman, Should Generational Accounts Replace the Annual Budget 
Estimates? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, at 95 n.1.
70 See note 66.
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given expected trends in population, economic growth, etc.?  Given those likely paths, 
what is the aggregate gap between spending and tax revenues into the infinite future?  
Taking the analysis one step further, it is then theoretically possible to estimate the net 
amount of money that an individual will pay in taxes to the government over his or her 
lifetime, which is the Generational Accounting part of the FG/GA approach.
The appeal of moving to long-term budget calculations loses its luster rather 
quickly, however, in the face of the complexity of long term budget estimation.  If the 
Social Security calculations described earlier are challenging, these calculations are 
significantly more so.  Consider the inputs necessary to generate an FG/GA estimate.  
Tax receipts for each future year must be calculated on the basis of estimates of the 
number of taxpayers, their gross incomes, their deductions (and exclusions and 
exemptions), and their tax rates.  Only the last of these numbers is written into law (and 
highly variable law at that), whereas the others depend on long-term estimates of birth 
rates, death rates, net immigration rates, productivity growth rates, homeownership rates, 
trends in medical insurance coverage by the private sector, and on and on.
Certainly, some long-term estimates can be quite reliable.  Birth and death rates 
change rather slowly, so projecting the number of native-born Americans likely to be 
living in thirty or forty years is not much of a stretch.  On the other hand, other estimates 
are notoriously volatile.  The CBO has changed its estimates of annual deficits, for 
example, by as much as 100% over the space of several months.  Even longer-term 
forecasts, which are plausibly less prone to temporary blips, are more prone to 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art20
Page 43
cumulative error.71  Indeed, even history is unstable, as the “New Economy’s” 
performance in the 1990’s has been substantially reduced by updated official estimates.
A recent calculation of the Fiscal Gap, using the most current version of the 
FG/GA methodology, has been provided by Gokhale and Smetters.72  Admirably 
transparent in its description of how the calculations were derived,73 this study estimates 
a Fiscal Gap of $44.2 trillion, of which $7 trillion is attributable to Social Security, $36.6 
trillion is attributable to Medicare (split roughly equally between Part A and Part B), and 
only $0.5 trillion is attributable to the rest of the federal government.74
Gokhale and Smetters provide a range of scenarios under which the Fiscal Gap 
could be erased, suggesting as their most likely choice an immediate and permanent 
16.6% increase in wage taxes.75  Updated estimates based on the same model (crucially 
71 The pioneering economic forecaster Otto Eckstein, founder of Data Resources, Inc. (now 
DRI/McGraw-Hill) once offered advice to his graduate students in words to the following effect: “You can 
believe our quarterly forecasts rounded to a full percentage point (e.g., 4.3% growth forecasts mean that 
growth will be somewhere in the neighborhood of 4% in the next quarter).  You can believe the sign of our 
annual forecasts.  And you should just ignore our five-year projections.”
72 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters.  Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget 
Measures for New Budget Priorities.  The AEI Press (2003).
73 While the discussion of the mechanics of their estimates is clear, it is hardly dispassionate.  Words 
like “drastic” permeate the discussion, which (given the study’s conclusions) perhaps understandably 
presents an urgent (even alarmist) tone.
74 Id. at 3.  (Gokhale and Smetters prefer the term Fiscal Imbalance, but I will use the more common 
Fiscal Gap.)  This is a midpoint estimate.  The lower bound is $29 trillion, while the higher bound—“under
still quite conservative assumptions”—is $64 trillion.  Id. at 6.
75 Id. at 6.
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including the just-passed Medicare drug benefit) show the Fiscal Gap to have reached 
approximately $73 trillion.76 (Note, however, that these estimates are presented as dollar 
figures with no standard of comparison.  $44 trillion is simply a big number.  Since the 
corresponding measure of discounted infinite-horizon GDP is $615 trillion,77 the FG-to-
GDP ratio is approximately seven percent—perhaps an important number, but much less 
likely to grab headlines.78)
The analysis below will show that the exact estimates provided by such studies—
whether $44 trillion, $73 trillion, or some other large number—are ultimately not very 
helpful in fiscal analysis.  The purpose, again, is not to engage in dueling long-term 
estimates, but to assess what can be learned from such long-term estimates.
2. Lifetime Net Tax Rates
Although it is analytically separable from the long-term budgeting calculation, the 
“generational” part of Generational Accounting provides perhaps its most potent political 
impact.  Kotlikoff argues that it is possible to move from the “What if we did nothing?” 
question to compare the treatment of different generations based on their lifetime receipts 
of government benefits and their lifetime tax payments. Using the same method 
described above, it is possible to choose arbitrary cutoff dates for different generations 
and then to calculate their “lifetime net tax rates,” i.e., the net present value of their 
76 Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the 
Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C.L.Rev. 1285, 1299 (2004).
77 Gokhale and Smetters at 4.
78 The $44 trillion figure has received prominent placement in The New York Times.  See Edmund 
L. Andrews, Fearing That a Gap Will Become a Chasm, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2004, at C1.
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lifetime tax payments minus the net present value of their lifetime government-paid 
benefits.
Seeming to confirm the suspicion that a large population cohort in a democracy 
could distort the benefit system in its favor (especially in a democracy in which the 
young are less likely to vote), Kotlikoff made national headlines when he announced in 
1993 that the lifetime net tax rate of younger generations would be 71%, whereas the rate 
for Baby Boomers would be 35%, and the rate for current retirees was 21%.79  A few 
years later, the numbers became even more dramatic, when the 71% figure was increased 
to 84%.80
B. Weaknesses in the FG/GA Framework
As appealing as the basic foundations of FG/GA might be, the theory does not 
deliver what it promises.  Far from being a neutral tool for dispassionate evaluation by 
policymakers, the generational accounting model makes the fiscal horizon look far worse 
than it will probably be, and these results can color the policy debate for the worse.  
Moreover, the hope that FG/GA calculations can act as a default early-warning system is 
at best overdrawn.  It is simply not possible to define a clean baseline.  Finally, the 
economic assumptions on which FG/GA is based are too contestable to use for 
meaningful policy analysis.
79 Kotlikoff, supra note 4 (“Deficit Delusion”).
80 Cohen, supra note 6, cites this higher figure, as does Shaviro, supra note 8, at 716.  On the other 
hand, when Kotlikoff recently recalculated his generational accounts and found that the 84% rate for future 
generations had fallen to 35.81% (cited in Shaviro, supra note 12, at 150), the “good” news was not met 
with fanfare.  (The incredible precision of those estimates is a separate issue.)
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1. Paying Down the Debt
The source of the huge differences between generations noted above is quite 
peculiar.  The generational accounts assume that, as of the date that an account is 
calculated, there are two groups of citizens: the generations that are already born and the 
one that is about to be born.81  Then, the accounts compute the taxes that the already-born 
will pay minus the direct cash benefits that they will receive (both of which are in part 
known, because some taxes and expenditures are already history), under the current tax 
and spending regimes.
The soon-to-be-born are, however, treated differently.82  For them, lifetime taxes 
include not just those that they would be forced to pay under current law, but also taxes 
sufficient to pay down the entire national debt (accumulated before they were born) 
during their lifetimes.83  There is no good reason to assume that the entire national debt 
will or must be paid in that time, but that is the assumption that drove the dramatic 84% 
result.
On its own, of course, this assumption cannot help but make things look much 
worse for the new generation.  With an entire lifetime of work ahead of them, and with 
the government unable to borrow money, they must pay for their own benefits as well as 
81 This means, of course, that the political audience for these estimates, the younger non-voters, was 
in fact not included in the group that is supposed to be paying nearly all of their lifetime income in net 
taxes.
82 Haveman, supra note __, at 100.
83 Id. at n.5 (“In effect, there are two implicit fiscal regimes in place during the future years when 
both members of current generations and members of future generations are living.”)
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those of their parents and grandparents.  The older generations, meanwhile, had a good 
ride, and they are allowed to continue that ride even while their heirs are paying for the 
difference.84
The generational impact of current fiscal policy, however, is better viewed 
through the more traditional crowding-out lens.  Current deficits are likely to decrease 
future growth in GDP, which makes future generations worse off than they otherwise 
would be.  The inter-generational comparisons are becoming less relevant as the 
generations that benefited from the expansion of Social Security and Medicare die off.  
Moving forward, the real question is reduced to the now-versus-later question that should 
always have been the central focus of budgetary analysis.  We cannot know whether any 
single future generation will be called upon to pay down the debt; but we can say that any 
decision that raises deficits at one point in time—assuming that those deficits do not 
finance productive public investment—is likely to cumulatively decrease future GDP.
2. Benefits Not Counted in a Generation’s Accounts
The calculation of any particular generation’s lifetime net tax rate also excludes 
many of the indirect benefits provided by governments—indeed, the very benefits for 
which governments are traditionally thought to exist.  The only benefits that go into the
FG/GA calculation are those that are paid in cash.  The benefits from cleaner air, pleasant 
84 Since the government’s bondholders tend to be older (especially indirectly through retirement 
funds), this also skews the inter-generational comparison as income is redistributed upward.
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parks, medical research and development, lower crime, etc. are not counted as benefits.  
Taxes pay for them, but they are a net cost of government in the FG/GA calculations.85
It is not clear a priori how this fault in the generational accounts would affect 
inter-generational comparisons.  Indeed, it is imaginable that these benefits are so diffuse 
that they benefit every citizen equally.  It is also possible, though, that some of these 
benefits are disproportionately shared.  The cost of educating the Baby Boomers was 
borne by our parents, yet all future generations will benefit from it.
Leaving that very open question aside, though, the fact that the FG/GA
calculations of lifetime net tax rates are skewed upward is important simply because it 
skews the political response.  If the members of Gen X are told that their net tax rate is 
84%, while that of their parents is 35%, they are likely to have two responses: 1) Our 
generation is being cheated, and 2) All generations are being cheated!  After all, while 
35% is better than 84%, paying more than a third of your lifetime earnings to a 
government that (according to this model) does not do anything useful with the money is 
likely to be rather upsetting.
If, on the other hand, the numbers were 8.4% and 3.5%, the magnitude of the 
inter-generational backlash would be muted (since outrage is likely to be at least partly 
based on the magnitude of the difference as well as the proportional comparison), and the 
anti-government reaction might not even register politically.
85 It is, of course, always possible to adjust the FG/GA calculations to take these non-cash benefits 
into account.  To the extent that this can be done, FG/GA begins to resemble capital budgeting.
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In other words, the effects on society of this widely-quoted statistic go beyond the 
simple, modest claim that FG/GA is just a diagnostic tool.  It is a political tool, and its 
affects are predictable.
3. Demographic Trends and Health Care Spending
As discussed above, the most important demographic phenomenon facing the 
U.S. and other Western countries is the Baby Boom and the subsequent dramatic decline
in birth rates after 1964.  While this phenomenon will end within a few decades, at least 
some parts of the fiscal gap are not going to be solved simply by the death of the 
Boomers.
An important trend is the general increase in life expectancies over the long term.  
Indeed, given long-term trends in health, even after the 75-year window, the paths of 
receipts and expenditures continue to diverge, as an increasingly large non-working aged 
population consumes more of the economy’s resources, largely through the health care 
system.
If this turns out to be true, it would mean that our focus should not be on the 
effects of the Baby Boomers but on eventually reining in our seemingly insatiable 
appetites for medical care.  While that might be a wise policy on its own, however, the 
FG/GA framework does not provide a compelling reason to adopt such limits.
For example, Shaviro cites research indicating that healthcare expenditures on the 
elderly will continue to rise significantly relative to GDP.86  This, however, assumes that 
health care spending on an aging population will show the same trends as current health 
86 Shaviro, supra note __, at 152.
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care expenditures.  For example, if the typical 75-year-old today consumes a given 
amount of health care, and if there will be twice as many living 75-year-olds in 50 years, 
then it would appear that health care spending would have to double in the future.  This 
assumes, in turn, that even though life expectancies will rise, elder health at specific ages 
will not improve.
We know, however, that a large fraction of the money spent on health care is 
spent at the very end of life—heroic, life-prolonging procedures that add a few weeks or 
months to the lives of chronically ill patients.87  If those chronically ill patients do not 
become chronically ill until twenty years later in life, however, there is no reason why 
overall health care spending must rise—even if we never change the way we deal with 
end-of-life decisions.
This is not to say that it is impossible to imagine a future with higher health care 
expenditures.  It does indicate, however, just how difficult it is to rely on estimates of 
health-related spending decades in the future.  Current estimates indicate that healthcare 
spending will rise from 15.4% of GDP in 2004 to 18.7% in 2014 and that the federal 
government’s share of that spending will rise to 49 percent of the total.88
The calculations in Gokhale and Smetters, on the other hand, are based on a much 
simpler assumption, that medical care will grow for the next 75 years at a rate one 
87 Daniel Altman, How to Save Medicare?  Die Sooner, N.Y.Times, Feb. 27, 2005, at § 3, p. 1 (“For 
the last few decades, the share of Medicare costs incurred by patients in their last year of life has stayed at 
about 28 percent.”)
88 Robert Pear, Health Costs Will Keep Rising, U.S. Says, Along With Government Share of Paying 
Them, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2005, at A20.
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percentage point faster than the growth rate of GDP, then fall over the ensuing 20 years 
to grow at a rate equal to GDP growth.  These assumptions mirror those made by the 
Medicare Trustees.89 The vast majority of their estimated Fiscal Gap, both pre- and post-
2078, is caused by the Medicare growth assumption,90 suggesting that it is probably more 
accurate to describe any long-term fiscal crisis as an economy-wide health care crisis.91
If the cost of medical care continues to grow in future decades at rates 
consistently exceeding the growth rate of GDP, then certainly a policy intervention will 
become necessary. While it is possible to starve everything else in the service of health 
care, it would be more sensible to recognize that the core of the problem lies not in public 
finance but in health policy.  Fixing that problem will prevent needless and possibly 
unwise cuts in other fiscal priorities.
4. After-tax Standard of Living
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the estimates of lifetime net tax rates are 
analytically incomplete.  What is left out is the question of whether future generations are 
worse off because of the higher net tax rates.  If pre-tax income is rising faster than tax 
rates, future generations can be better off even though they will pay higher tax rates.
According to the CBO, this is precisely what would happen under their mid-range 
assumptions (that is, the assumptions that lead to trust fund depletion in 2052). In its 
89 Gokhale and Smetters at 23.
90 See note 105 and accompanying text.
91 Paul R. Krugman, Social Security Scares, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2004, at A23 (“The projected rise 
in Medicare expenses is mainly driven not by demography, but by the rising cost of medical care, which in 
turn mainly reflects medical progress, which allows doctors to treat a wider range of conditions.”)
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most recent report, CBO analyzed the benefits received by workers, organized in ten-year 
birth cohorts from 1940 (the group that is currently retiring) to 2000 (today’s toddlers).92
Even after assuming an across-the-board cut in benefits starting in 2053 (“current law”), 
CBO’s estimates show that no birth cohort has a lower present value of inflation-adjusted 
lifetime benefits than any previous generation.  Only the lowest quintile of the population 
shows any cohort facing a net decrease in real lifetime benefits (for the 1980 and 1990 
cohorts), and even those cohorts do better than the 1940, 1950, and 1960 cohorts.93  (This 
difference could also be addressed by future policymakers if they choose not to make cuts 
across the board but rather adjusted relative benefits to prevent low-income workers from 
facing cuts.)
In short, the issue presented by the Generational Accounts estimates is misleading 
in that it focuses on lifetime tax rates rather than lifetime standard of living.  While 
dramatically high tax rates grab headlines, they should not be the focus of fiscal 
policymakers or the public.
C. Generational Accounting Without Generations?
Populist appeal aside, the importance of the generational part of the FG/GA 
approach should not be underestimated.  Kotlikoff and his co- authors argue that they 
have created a meaningful baseline, allowing us to assess the effects of any proposed 
government policy over the long run, and potentially comparing that affect on different 
92 CBO Update, Tab. 2-1.
93 Id.
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age groups.  If these claims were true, then it would be important for everyone to send 
their policy proposals through the FG/GA machine.  If the results of such an analysis 
turned out negative, the policy would be presumed harmful until proven beneficial.
On the other hand, we could also take a step back and remove the generations out 
of generational accounting, simply stopping after we compute the Fiscal Gap.  We could 
thereby look at long-term trends and calculate long-term tax revenues and government 
spending assuming a continuation of current policies.  If this calculation were to show a 
deficit, then it is a warning: Unless something is changed, the government will have to 
cut spending or raise taxes on future generations.  While we might still choose to do 
nothing, the argument continues, at least the FG would give us a fair number from which 
to work.94
1. Another Baseline Problem
The asserted agnosticism behind FG calculations thus rests on the idea that they 
are warnings, not predictions.  Indeed, if FG is used as its proponents suggest, we enable 
ourselves to make “tough but sensible” choices now to prevent the disaster that surely 
awaits us if we fail to act.95  In fact, though, the theory is not agnostic, and its proponents’ 
call to action rests on weak assumptions.
The underlying question is one of default.  Once the cross-generational 
comparisons are set aside, FG claims to ask, in essence: “If we were to change absolutely 
94 Even Haveman, supra note __, despite offering a withering criticism of GA, allows that this “base 
case” analysis can provide useful information.  Id. at 100, 110.
95 Shaviro, supra note __, at 716 (arguing that politicians should “openly fac[e] today painful 
choices that ultimately will have to be faced anyway.”)
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nothing, and if we can believe the forecasts on which our estimates are based, are our 
current fiscal policies allowing living generations to steal economic resources from their 
grandchildren and their grandchildren’s grandchildren?”  But it does not stop there.  If the 
answer to that question is yes, then the argument is that we must act now.  Why now?  
Because our current path is unsustainable, and delay is only going to allow matters to 
worsen.96  Sacrifice today means sowing a greater harvest tomorrow.
While this logic surely appeals to our Puritan roots, it is misleading.  We should 
only enact new policies now if we believe that we will not change policies along the way 
for other reasons.  By way of analogy, consider the concept (known as “bracket creep”) 
that tax rates in the 1970’s would have led to an ever-higher percentage of GDP being 
collected by the IRS, because inflation was pushing everyone inexorably into the highest 
tax brackets.  If that argument had been coupled with a call to raise government spending 
immediately, because we can count on ever-higher revenues in the future, surely that 
would have been widely derided as a foolish conclusion.  Everyone knew that Congress 
would pass regular tax cuts to undo the effects of bracket creep; so even if no one 
anticipated the indexing of brackets to inflation in the 1981 tax bill, certainly no one 
thought that everyone would end up in the 70% tax bracket when inflation had made even 
a street-sweeper “rich.”97
96 Id. (arguing that we should act “sooner rather than later”).  See also Gokhale and Smetters at 3.
97 There are, of course, strong political economy arguments for indexing the tax code rather than 
relying on ad hoc corrections; but those are beside the point here.
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Similarly, the FG call to action loses much of its appeal when we realize that this 
“interesting calculation” is based on arbitrary economic forecasts98 combined with the 
arbitrary assumption that only a few things are set in stone.  Consider the current path of 
tax rates.  Current tax law is in a bizarre state, because of the ten-year reversion feature of 
the 2001 tax bill.99  The estate tax is set to decline, disappear, and reappear.  The 28% tax 
bracket declines to 25% and then returns to 28% (with similar moves in the other 
brackets, and some brackets merging into others only to reappear in 2011).  No one 
expects the reversion to happen.  The House in 2002 passed, on partisan lines, a bill to 
make the 2001 cuts permanent—although no one viewed that action as anything more 
than election year posturing.  Even with the current one-party dominance of the federal 
government increasing the likelihood of tax cuts, it is not clear what form those cuts will 
take.
With the status quo ante not a serious possibility, and the status quo post unlikely 
ever to become the status quo at all, how can one even formulate a call to action on the 
basis of an FG calculation?  In addition, current projections assume that the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (which is not indexed to inflation) will remain in place, even though it will 
98 See Haveman, supra note __, at 99 n.4.
99 Because of a self-imposed super-majority voting requirement in the Senate, bills that would reduce 
tax revenues beyond ten years from the effective date of a bill require sixty votes to pass.  Lacking 
sufficient votes, the Senate made all provisions of the 2001 tax act void in 2011.
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almost surely be altered or repealed when it begins to affect large sections of the middle 
class.100
2. What Happens When People Live Longer?
Carrying this over to the demographic argument is potentially even more 
devastating to the FG position.  If the time paths of revenues and expenditures do not 
come back together after the death of the Baby Boom generation because of the trends in 
life expectancies, then surely it is important to forecast how those longer life expectancies 
will change both individual behavior and government policy.  The Social Security 
trustees estimate that the average life expectancy for men will rise from 74 in 2000 (the 
last year for which final calculations are available) to 78.8 in 2045 and 81.6 in 2080, with 
women’s longevities lengthening over those same years from 79.4 to 82.9 to 85.3.101
As people live longer, they will naturally use more economic resources, possibly 
including medical care (as discussed above).  People might also produce more economic 
resources.  Based on current law in which retirement ages are rising to 67 and then 
staying put, FG/GA estimates would have us believe that in 75 years—assuming that all 
of the other forecasts over that time span are true—we will have a nation of impressively 
healthy septuagenarians (and older) living off of the sweat of a relatively tiny population 
of younger workers.
100 Leonard E. Burman, et al., The Individual AMT: Problems and Potential Solutions, Tax Policy 
Center Discussion Paper No. 5 (2002).
101 Trustees’ Report at 81, Tab. V.A.3.
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Why make the assumption that the retirement age (effective if not statutory) will 
remain fixed as the population inevitably ages (relatively) healthfully?  Boredom alone is 
likely to lead to a changed politics of retirement, with some people voluntarily staying 
employed or returning to the work force to fill the void.  Moreover, the increasingly 
fragile financial condition of the elderly is keeping many people involuntarily in the labor 
force after reaching retirement age.102  CBO estimates that increasing the retirement age 
from 67 to keep up with life expectancy would reduce Social Security benefits by 12% in 
2050.103  While such an increase in the retirement age would be the arithmetic equivalent 
of a benefit cut, the point is that it or something like it is likely to happen in any case, 
making the “nothing else changes” baseline assumption particularly problematic.
While an advocate of FG/GA can always claim that their calculations can tell us 
what happens if retirement ages do not change, that is a far cry from justifying the 
argument that we need to cut benefits and raise taxes today on retirees in order to bring 
the long-term budget into balance.
Indeed, Gokhale and Smetters do allow themselves to make a single departure 
from their blanket assumption that policy is set in stone.  Separate from the “bracket 
creep” caused by inflation, real economic growth can cause “real bracket creep,” whereby 
increases in real income cause every taxpayer’s income ultimately to rise to the highest 
102 See, e.g., Jennifer Bayot, As Bills Mount, Debts on Homes Rise for Elderly.  N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 
2004, Sec. 1, at 1 (“Many [elderly borrowers] are forgoing retirement and taking on part-time work.”); 
Eduardo Porter and Mary Williams Walsh, Retirement Becomes Rest Stop As Pensions and Benefits Shrink, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2005, at A1
103 Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, at 239 (Feb. 2005).
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bracket.  Gokhale and Smetters quite reasonably view this as absurd and thus assume that 
the brackets will be adjusted over time to prevent this from happening.  This, of course, 
makes the estimated Fiscal Gap look worse; but more importantly, it raises the question 
of why this is the only concession to reality that is allowed in the estimates going 
forward.
3. The Fiscal Gap and the Annual Deficit
Perhaps the FG calculation should not be viewed as an important measure of the 
level of future deficits, but rather as a way to measure changes in future deficits.  In other 
words, even if we do not feel confident that a $44 trillion FG estimate (or any other 
estimate) is reliable, we might still use it to measure the effects of the change in policy.  
(By analogy, we know that GDP is an imperfect measure of well-being; but if we 
conclude that the unmeasured aspects of GDP move roughly in proportion to measured 
GDP, we might use GDP as an acceptable proxy for well-being.)  If a new policy raised 
the FG calculation from $50 trillion to $60 trillion, under this view, that would be 
valuable information.
There is something to be said for this argument; and it certainly supports the 
conclusion that there is no reason to have our statistical agencies simply discontinue FG 
calculations entirely.  It remains to be proven—although it seems plausible—that the 
weakness of the FG calculations does not make estimated changes in FG just as weak as 
the FG calculations themselves.  Unless that can be shown, relying on FG estimates for 
this purpose is a leap of faith.
The absolute level of the estimated Fiscal Gap is important for another reason.  
“[T]he [Fiscal Gap] grows by about $1.6 trillion per year to $54 trillion by just 2008 
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unless corrective policies are implemented before then.  This rapid annual increment is 
also about ten times as large as the official annual deficit reported for fiscal year 
2002.”104 Gokhale and Smetters thus suggest that the “true” deficit is not measured 
accurately by the annual cash-flow deficit but by the change in the Fiscal Gap from year 
to year.  Because that annual change, in the absence of policy enactments, is simply equal 
to the previous year’s Fiscal Gap times the assumed annual interest rate, this annual 
quasi-deficit measure will be much smaller if we allow the forecasts in the Fiscal Gap to 
include changes in retirement ages, health care cost trends, etc.  If the estimated Fiscal 
Gap were something like $15 trillion, in other words, the annual quasi-deficit would be 
just over $500 billion, whereas a Fiscal Gap of $88 trillion would imply an annual quasi-
deficit of $3.2 trillion.  The annual changes depend completely on the accuracy of the 
aggregate estimate of the level of FG.
4. Making the Fiscal Gap Disappear
Even if it were possible to agree on the likely future path of policy decisions, the 
Fiscal Gap can be manipulated simply by enacting policies which will take effect in the 
future.  If, instead of Gokhale and Smetters’s suggested immediate increase in wage taxes 
of 16.6%, Congress enacted an increase in wage taxes that started at 0.1% in twenty years 
and rose to some level well in excess of 16.6% twenty years later, the Fiscal Gap would 
immediately become zero.  Cynics would argue that this is non-credible, and they would 
have a point.  As enacted policy (“current law”), however, such a law would make the 
Fiscal Gap equal to zero, by definition.  The annual quasi-deficit would then also equal 
104 Gokhale and Smetters, at 3.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Page 60
zero.  While nothing would have changed, these fiscal measures would show nothing
amiss.
It is true that there would still be a relative burdening of future generations.  As 
discussed below, it is not immediately clear that relatively burdening future generations is 
to be avoided, given that even the most pessimistic estimates of future GDP predict that 
future generations are likely to enjoy significantly higher levels of income than we 
currently do.
5. How Far Into the Future?
Finally, Gokhale and Smetters use an infinite horizon rather than the 75-year 
horizon that is the norm in such analyses.  As they point out, their model predicts a Social 
Security gap of $1.6 trillion over the 75-year horizon, compared to an infinite-horizon 
gap of $7 trillion, while the 75-year Medicare gap is $15.1 trillion, compared to the $36.6 
trillion in their infinite-horizon model.105  In other words, over sixty percent of the Fiscal 
Gap occurs from 2078 through infinity.  Prescribing policy initiatives for current 
lawmakers on the basis of such long-term projections borders on being arbitrary.
In short, the Fiscal Gap and Generational Accounts are generally not useful in 
guiding policy, because they are based on highly questionable forecasts, they ignore the 
effects of likely future political decisions, and they are far too easy to manipulate.  
Moreover, they cannot meaningfully compare the relationships among generations in 
how they share the cost of running the federal government, at least in a way that is 
105 Gokhale and Smetters, at 34.
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different from the standard crowding-out approach.  While the exercise of measuring 
Fiscal Gaps is based on a reasonable desire to see what we might be getting ourselves 
into, the mechanisms for such long-term forecasts are simply too crude to add 
meaningfully to our arsenal of policy choices.106
As noted in Section II above, though, this critique—as strongly worded as it is—
should not be misconstrued as a call for willful ignorance.  Having long-term estimates 
available will at least be useful in the situation where any plausible set of assumptions 
still shows that current policies will lead to huge future fiscal imbalances.  The more 
robust these long-term estimates are to varying assumptions, the more seriously we 
should take them.  The current FG estimates, though, as dramatic as they may seem, do 
not add meaningfully to our knowledge of how wrong-headed our current fiscal policies 
are.  The problems arising from deficits estimated over the 10-year horizon should be 
more than enough to give reasonable policymakers pause.107
106 Arguably, the lesson to be drawn from an exercise like that of Gokhale and Smetters is that the 
news is good, i.e., outside of the more general question of how to handle health care costs (both inside and 
outside of Medicare), we do not apparently face significant long-term budget problems.  If so, then the 
exercise is worthwhile in a negative sense.  Still, there are less favorable assumptions that could make the 
Fiscal Gap calculation look worse, especially the extension the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts and the elimination 
or indexation of the Alternative Minimum Tax, and those assumptions are subject to all of the uncertainties 
described here.  If Fiscal Gap calculations are to be but one piece of information among many, therefore, 
they at least should not be given the prominence that Gokhale and Smetters would give them.
107 See William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag, Bush Administration Tax Policy:
Revenue and Budget Effects, Tax Notes, Oct. 4, 2004.  (“For example, to pay for the tax cuts in 2014
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V. What Does it Mean to Be Fair to Future Generations?
The unspoken assumption in all of this discussion is that the government should 
never make decisions that would reduce economic well-being in the future.  Even if one 
completely agrees that the measurement problems discussed above must be addressed, 
one is still proceeding from the assumption that a decision is bad per se if it would reduce 
the level of real goods and services available to future generations.
The policy regime that FG/GA analysis implies is thus clear: immediate fiscal 
contraction, austerity, and pain.  The positive spin is that the pain can be “shared.”  Two 
somewhat inconsistent norms are offered in designing policies to redress the long-term 
imbalances.
A. The Norms of Generational Equality vs. Shared Sacrifice
The most obvious norm, upon which Kotlikoff and his co-authors explicitly rely, 
is simple cross-generational equality of tax rates.108  Every generation should pay a 
lifetime net tax rate no higher than the last.  Other than symmetry, though, there is no 
apparent philosophical imperative behind this norm.  Indeed, since the whole notion of 
would require a 45 percent reduction in Social Security benefits, a 53 percent cut in Medicare benefits, or 
changes of a similar magnitude.”)  While Gale and Orszag’s paper also presents long-term FG projections, 
the extra information that those projections provide is marginal at best.  At the very least, it is difficult to 
imagine how a policymaker who was not moved to action by the 10-year estimates would be somehow 
spurred by estimates of problems arising in 2080 or beyond.
108 See Diamond, supra note __, at 1.
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lifetime net tax rates tells us nothing about real after-tax living standards, there is no 
obvious reason to be concerned about lifetime net tax rates at all.
Recognizing this, Shaviro argues for the norm not of equal tax rates but of shared 
sacrifice.  “With respect to generational distribution, once the members of a given age 
cohort have died, they can no longer be asked to share in the pain of tax increases or 
benefit reductions.”109  In other words, it is important to take the benefits away from the 
old people now because they are alive now.  While there are certainly colorable (but 
highly debatable) arguments that the elderly over-consume,110 the current elderly also 
have a strong argument that they earned it.
B. How Much is Enough?
It is possible, as noted earlier, that even a decision by the government to consume 
economic resources rather than to invest them will not harm future economic prospects.  
This will happen if the resources that the government purchases for its use would have 
been used to produce private consumption rather than private investment.  Conceptually, 
if the government throws a wild party by hiring the people who would have worked at a 
privately-funded wild party, then future generations are unaffected.  It is only if the 
government’s party is (at least indirectly) staffed by computer programmers and 
construction workers that the future productive capacity of the economy is reduced.
This, however, still leaves open the question of why we must maximize what we 
pass on to our heirs.  Given that economic growth is generally on an upward trend, why is 
109 Shaviro, supra note __, at 155.
110 See Cohen, supra note __.
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it necessary to give our wealthy grandchildren even greater wealth? The bipartisan 
(within the economics profession as well as among politicians) silence on this question is 
notable, to say the least.  While there have been preliminary attempts to estimate how 
much capital should be produced for future generations,111 the unspoken norm is quite 
blunt: We should not do anything to reduce the standard of living that we bequeath to our 
children and grandchildren from the higher level that we have already guaranteed them.
The assumption that future generations are entitled to “their” share is tendentious.  
The higher living standard that future generations will enjoy arises from productivity 
gains that are themselves largely the results of technological innovations for which those 
future generations will not be responsible.  If workers in the automated plant of 2030 can 
be expected to produce many more widgets per hour than their 2005 predecessors thanks 
to the invention of a robot in 2005, it is hardly clear that the 2030 workers are entitled to 
all the fruits of this productivity gain, even on Lockean premises.
Shaviro offers an interesting defense of favoring (richer) future generations, on 
utilitarian grounds.112  He suggests that, precisely because future generations are likely to 
have higher standards of living, they might value a marginal dollar more highly than we 
currently do.  While thought-provoking, this argument is simply a variation on the notion 
of “utility monsters,” i.e., rich people whose subjective enjoyment from increased 
consumption is so much greater than other people’s enjoyment that a utility-maximizing 
social planner would continue to shift consumption to them from poor people because the 
111 See N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, 2000.
112 Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cutting Taxes in the 
Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C.L.Rev. 1285, 1330 (2004).
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monsters’ increase in happiness is, in the aggregate, worth it.  Redistribution from poor to 
rich would, under such an assumption, increase total utility.
This argument, while innovative, is simply too conjectural to guide policymakers.  
If we are to start redistributing upward because rich people might like consumption more 
than poor people do, then we can redistribute to any favored group for the same reason.  
More importantly, as Shaviro concedes, this argument provides no way to measure how 
much is enough.113  Even if we were to agree that future generations’ ability to enjoy 
their wealth might be relatively high, that does not tell us that every policy that results in 
smaller increases in GDP is a utilitarian loss.
Perhaps it is time, therefore, at least to question that assumption.  (Moreover, 
although the subject for a different essay, it is equally important to account for the 
“intergenerational unfairness” created by problems such as environmental damage.)  
Although many analysts (including the present author) would be unlikely to call for 
policies that would absolutely decrease future living standards, there is still plenty of 
room for debate regarding how much of an increase is enough.
C. The Real Inter-Generational Issues
The very language of intergenerational transfer is, therefore, potentially 
misleading.  Indeed, it is not possible to “pass the bill to future generations” for our 
current spending.114  When the government uses economic resources, the rest of the 
economy currently cannot use those resources.  (This, of course, assumes that those 
resources were going to be used at all.  Given the prolonged slack in the global economy, 
113 Id. at 1332-33.
114 See Blinder, note __.
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even that assumption is often contestable.)  That means that we pay for what we do, in the 
fundamental sense of opportunity cost.
Future generations are, of course, affected by these decisions, too.  If, as discussed 
earlier, the government’s decisions are likely to decrease the net capital stock that is 
passed on to future generations, then their output will be lower than it would otherwise 
be.  Therefore, the best approach is to think about how the government is using current 
resources.  If it is investing them, then future generations will benefit.  If it is consuming 
them (or simply wasting them), then they will not.
Even more fundamentally, it is not at all obvious that cutting benefits to seniors 
today will hurt only seniors.  When the elderly lose benefits, they can turn to their 
children to make up the difference.  Even if they do not do so directly, they can consume 
more of their estate than they otherwise would have, thus reducing the wealth of their 
children.  This incidence question indicates just how difficult it is to measure 
meaningfully the impact on different generations of our fiscal policies.
VI. Conclusion
The traditional debate about budget deficits witnessed a divergence between the 
economic analysis, which saw that deficits are poorly measured in the U.S. and argued 
that certain deficits are actually beneficial for the economy, and the political view that 
every deficit is evidence of moral failure.  This peculiar stalemate is currently on hold, as 
the brief era of surpluses gave way to the (hopefully even more brief) era of terror and 
war, leading to a decreased emphasis on fiscal orthodoxy and tolerance for relatively high 
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annual deficits into the foreseeable future—even though most of those deficits are not 
related to terrorism or war.
In place of a debate over our general fiscal status, political leaders are currently 
focused on the supposed long-term problems faced by the Social Security system.  While 
a need might ultimately arise to make some adjustments to future Social Security benefits 
and tax rates, the evidence available to this point does not call for immediate action but 
rather cautious monitoring of future developments.
In addition, an alternative approach to budgeting, the computation of Fiscal Gaps 
and Generational Accounts (FG/GA), has emerged over the last fifteen years.  Designed 
to correct some of the analytical weaknesses of annual budgeting and to extend to the 
entire budget the long- term analysis usually associated only with Social Security 
projections, FG/GA purports to provide an early-warning system to allow us to correct 
our broader long-term fiscal imbalances before it is too late.  Unfortunately, as appealing 
as this approach is in theory, it is based on highly contestable assumptions, makes 
questionable analytical choices, and is inherently incapable of providing the useful 
baseline that its proponents promise.  While long-term estimates of huge fiscal 
imbalances must obviously not be ignored out of hand , the case for responding to the 
current estimated fiscal gap is undermined by those estimates’ sensitivity to highly 
volatile assumptions.
Perhaps surprisingly, then, the best response is for policymakers to continue to 
rely on the current (admittedly imperfect) budget measures, which at least provide some 
useful guidance regarding the immediate and intermediate effects of our fiscal policies.
Annual and 10-year forecasts of deficits are admittedly arbitrary, but they tell us what 
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today’s politicians are committing us to over time horizons that permit relatively reliable 
measurement.  While it is always wise to look at all of the available evidence, current 
policy is not well measured or guided by long-term fiscal policy estimates.
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